Introduction
It is common for parties in international arbitration to engage and present experts to testify on technical matters, industry custom and legal issues.
1 It is also common and generally accepted that a party's counsel will work closely with a party-appointed expert, discussing substantive points of an expert's opinion, and providing comments on drafts of an expert's report, at least as to format, language and style.
2
Cautious counsel in international arbitration wonder whether their written communications with an expert, including drafts and markups of the expert's report, may be subject to production to the other side and to the arbitrators. To answer this question, we reviewed the disclosure practice in numerous unreported cases and we submitted questions to a broad range of international arbitration practitioners and arbitrators from varying legal backgrounds and regions. 3 We also reviewed written authority on the issue. In this Article, we seek to distill these sources into a summary of the prevailing practice and to offer guidance to practitioners. We also examine the trend that has led some common law jurisdictions to permit more extensive discovery of counselexpert communications in the context of domestic litigation, and consider whether such an approach is desirable in international arbitration. We conclude that it is not.
II. The Prevailing Practice in International Arbitration
A. The Presumption of Non-Discoverability of
Counsel-Expert Communications
Formal international guidelines on the discoverability of counsel-expert communications are rare. 4 National rules applicable to national court proceedings, where they exist, 5 vary widely and are, in any case, inapposite to international arbitration. 6 Our experience and our survey 3 In addition to surveying the collective experience of the White & Case International Arbitration Group, the authors contacted eighteen of the most prominent international arbitrators with extensive experience of international cases (both commercial and investment): eight in Continental Europe, two in Canada, four in the United States, two in the United Kingdom, one in Latin America and one in Asia. 'L 137, 152-53 (2008) . We examine the approach adopted in the CIArb Protocol below, Section II.B.2.
5
In civil law countries, experts are ordinarily appointed by the court and pre-trial document disclosure is minimal or non-existent. The separateness of international arbitration from the evidentiary/procedural regime governing national court litigation is reflected in the laws of major arbitral jurisdictions. In the United States, it is well-established that arbitrators are not constrained by formal rules of procedure or evidence. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956) (where the Supreme Court noted that " [a] rbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence"). In England, the Arbitration Act 1996 confers a wide discretion on the arbitral tribunal to decide issues of procedure and evidence. Section 34 thus provides that " [i] t shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter" and defines "procedural and evidential matters" as including "whether to apply strict rules of evidence (or any other rules)…." In Hong Kong, a tribunal may not order disclosure of documents privileged under Hong Kong nonetheless show shared expectations about the discoverability of counsel-expert communications in international arbitration. An overall presumption of non-discoverability, with certain common exceptions, can be discerned.
7
Production of documents reflecting such communications is rarely sought -almost all of the arbitrators questioned on the subject replied that they had never faced the question -and the overwhelming view among experienced international arbitrators is that, in the ordinary situation, production would not be warranted.
8
This view is shared by both civil law and common law arbitrators and, among the latter group, even by arbitrators from jurisdictions where mandatory production of counsel-expert communications is the rule in domestic litigation.
9
Commentators support the view that, regardless of the rules applicable to domestic litigation, the practice in international arbitration is not to require disclosure of counsel-expert communications.
10 Christopher Newmark explains: be the explanation. Rather, the consensus is better understood as reflecting the broad view that, as a general matter, the production of counsel-expert communications and drafts is not ordered because these documents are not considered sufficiently relevant -let alone material -to the outcome of the case. 15 This view of what matters in a case must explain why arbitrators from legal cultures with widely diverging approaches to evidentiary privileges are in agreement about the non-discoverability of counsel-expert communications in the ordinary course.
16
While counsel-expert communications may be relevant to a case to the extent that they assist in evaluating the credibility and independence of an expert, it would be highly unusual for an arbitral tribunal to grant production of communications between counsel and expert on the mere chance that some such communications might shed light upon the expert's independence. Rather, a production request of this nature would and should demonstrate that a certain communication exists and that there is a particular reason to conclude that it would be relevant and material to the arbitrators' determination of the case. This brings us to the following topic: the exceptions to the general prohibition against disclosure of counsel-expert communications.
B. The Potential Exceptions
Three potential exceptions to the non-discoverability of counsel-expert communications can be discerned. The first potential exception relates to materials relied upon, referenced by, or reviewed by an expert, the second to communications between counsel and expert regarding the scope of an expert's engagement, and the third to cases of abuse.
Counsel-Expert Communications Relied upon, Referenced by or Reviewed by an Expert
There are three categories of documents which can be said to be used by an expert: documents relied upon by an expert in forming his or her opinions; documents referenced by an expert in his or her report; and documents reviewed by an expert, although not necessarily relied upon or referenced. The first two categories (which in practice overlap to a significant extent) are considered together below. The third category -documents reviewed by an expert -is, plainly, the broadest of the three. We conclude that the first two categories are subject to production, and that documents in the third category usually are not. 
16
To cite but one example among many, a prominent Swiss arbitrator has explained that, in the one case where he faced the issue, the request for production of counsel-expert communications was rejected, irrespective of any privilege, because the requesting party could not establish the relevance of the communications. (Confidential communication on file with the authors.)
a. Documents relied upon or referenced by an expert
A competent expert report will usually attach as exhibits to the report all documents relied upon in forming his or her opinions. This practice is based on the principle of equality of arms, which requires that the opposing party be given an opportunity to review the same documents as the other party's expert. It is also necessary to permit an arbitral tribunal to evaluate properly the opinions and credibility of an expert. As a matter of practice, therefore, the first two categories of documents used by an expert overlap to a significant extent, and are usefully considered together.
The survey of practitioners and arbitrators shows a broad consensus among arbitration practitioners that counsel-expert communications, which would ordinarily benefit from a presumption against disclosure, become subject to production once relied upon by an expert, and in particular when referenced by an expert in his or her report.
17
The authors' recent experience is consistent with this consensus. In a New York-based ICC arbitration in 2008, a party sought production of drafts of an expert report which had been shown to a second expert engaged by the same party. The document was inadvertently included in a list of documents attached to the second expert's report. The arbitral tribunal, comprised of three U.S.-trained attorneys, ordered production of the drafts, with no discussion of what law governed the question of privilege and whether the draft was ever in fact privileged.
In a 2009 ICC arbitration in Stockholm, a party had produced an expert report that referenced certain preliminary opinion reports which the expert had prepared during the parties' negotiations, before the filing of the request for arbitration. When the opposing party requested production of these preliminary reports, the party proffering the expert report argued that these documents were privileged because they were mere drafts of the expert's final opinion, and because they were created in contemplation of litigation. The tribunal, composed of civil law lawyers, ordered production of the preliminary reports. The tribunal buttressed its decision by noting that the party resisting production had indicated a willingness to produce the document before the initiation of the arbitration.
These two examples demonstrate a clear principle: documents included in the list of materials relied upon by an expert are discoverable. This exception to the principle of non-discoverability of counsel-expert communications also has its basis in the relevance-and-materiality test for production of documents. That is, documents that would ordinarily not be relevant and material to the outcome of the case become so when an expert references them as bases for the opinions in his or her report.
In the first of the two cases described, the absence of any discussion as to whether the draft reports in question were subject to any attorney work-product privilege indicates that, in the view 17 None of the eighteen arbitrators surveyed questioned the applicability of this exception.
of the tribunal, applicable privileges (if any) were waived or overridden by the expert's reference to the document. Similarly, in the second example, the tribunal appears to have been of the view that the claimed litigation privilege attaching to the expert's preliminary reports was waived or overridden by the fact that the expert had referenced those documents in the final report. This suggests that the obligation to produce documents referenced by an expert would apply equally to documents prepared by counsel in contemplation of litigation and potentially covered by the attorney work-product doctrine. On this basis, if counsel provides an expert with notes of an interview with a key witness and these constitute part of the referenced factual underpinning for that expert's report, there is little doubt that the notes would be considered relevant and that that expert's reliance on them would suffice to waive any work-product protection, thus justifying disclosure.
A further question is whether the obligation to produce documents relied upon or referenced by an expert applies when such documents contain or reveal client confidences. Such documents might potentially be protected from disclosure by some form of attorney-client privilege or secret professionnel, a protection that is often regarded as more fundamental than that offered by the work-product doctrine, 18 and which can usually be waived only by the client. We see no blanket solution to this question; resolution of such a document production request would depend upon the circumstances. A tribunal faced with this issue would first need to understand properly the nature of the client information which would be revealed by production of the document (an in camera review of the document may assist). A tribunal may also need to consider the public policy implications of its ruling, and any applicable provisions of mandatory law. Given the strong consensus that documents relied upon or referenced by an expert should be produced, there is a reasonable prospect that an international arbitral tribunal would order production of such documents irrespective of any applicable attorney-client privilege or secret professionnel obligation.
19

b. Documents reviewed by an expert
We now consider whether production can be expected not only of documents relied upon or referenced by an expert but also, more broadly, of all documents reviewed by an expert. The argument in favor of requiring production of this broader category of documents -including, potentially, counsel-expert communications -is that limiting disclosure to documents relied 22 Rather, the chairman ordered production only of those documents that the expert had relied upon. Such an approach is justified for two reasons. First, the concern that an expert may deliberately conceal damaging documents can be addressed by cross-examination: what materials an expert reviewed (or failed to review), or listed in the report (or failed to list in the report), often constitutes the first line of questioning at a hearing. An expert who pretends not to have reviewed documents potentially damaging to his party does so at peril to his or her credibility, and to the party's case as a whole. Second, if a party is able to show that certain documents were reviewed by an expert, but not referenced, and that such documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the case (i.e., that they go to the issues on which the expert was asked to opine), that party may be able to obtain production of such documents by requesting them specifically. A blanket request for all documents reviewed by, or provided to, an expert is overbroad and unlikely to be granted by an arbitral tribunal.
Counsel-Expert Communications Regarding the Scope of an Expert's Engagement
A second potential exception to the presumption of non-discoverability of counsel-expert communications comprises those communications which have as their subject the scope of an expert's engagement, including directives received from counsel.
Expert reports can be difficult to understand, weigh and compare in the absence of information as to the scope of each expert's engagement, including the issues that an expert was asked to consider (or not). 23 There is an expectation that expert reports in international arbitration will include a statement summarizing the issues on which that expert was asked to opine and other material directives received from counsel. Expert reports may also include a statement of the financial terms of that expert's engagement (though this is not a common practice). There is broad agreement that a party should voluntarily disclose to the other party, and to the arbitral tribunal, the substance of the instructions provided to an expert.
The expectation that experts will voluntarily disclose the nature of their instructions does not answer the question whether information pertaining to an expert's instructions, beyond that voluntarily disclosed in that expert's report, can be obtained. The choices are, either, by crossexamination of the expert, or by an order for the production of the underlying document containing an expert's instructions. Requests to produce documents regarding the scope of an expert's engagement are rare in international arbitration, and, when faced with such a request, arbitrators are reluctant to order production.
John Tackaberry has written that "[i]ncreasingly, panels will expect to see the instructions that were given to the expert that led to the report…." 24 However, our experience does not support this expectation, and several of the arbitrators surveyed for the purpose of this Article expressed hesitation at the idea that production of documents might be ordered on the topic of instructions, while emphasizing that cross-examination about the scope of an expert's engagement was allowed as a matter of course.
In a recent ICC case, a party submitted an expert report that did not specify the instructions that that expert had received from counsel. The other side requested production of the documents that reflected the terms and scope of the expert's engagement. The arbitral tribunal, composed of civil law arbitrators, refused to order production of the documents setting out such instructions.
25
In summary, while cross-examination on the issue of an expert's instructions is always permissible, production of the documents containing an expert's instructions is not ordinarily an exception to the presumption of non-discoverability of counsel-expert communications. As of the date of this writing, no hearing had been held in that case, and it cannot be known whether the tribunal will allow questioning.
appointing Party and the basis of remuneration of the expert," which recommendation the authors understand contemplates a description by an expert in his/her report of the directives received from counsel. Despite the emphasis in Article 4 on the importance of voluntary disclosure of instructions, Article 5.1(b) of the CIArb Protocol precludes questioning of an expert regarding his or her instructions unless the tribunal is satisfied that there is good cause. In this respect, the CIArb Protocol is more restrictive than the prevailing practice in international arbitration.
While Articles 4 and 5 of the CIArb Protocol can be read to take a pro-disclosure stance with respect to an expert's instructions, the emphasis is on the importance of voluntary disclosure in an expert's report. Article 5 of the CIArb Protocol says that an arbitral tribunal is not to order production of the underlying documents containing the instructions to an expert absent "good cause." Although "good cause" is not defined in the Protocol, this concept was likely imported from the Civil Procedure Rules in England. 26 If English practice is a guide, "good cause" would include the situation where there are reasonable grounds to find that an expert's statement of his instructions is "inaccurate or incomplete."
27
A word of caution is needed regarding this brief discussion of the purpose and scope of Articles 4 and 5 of the CIArb Protocol. We have assumed that the term "instructions" refers to that particular set of counsel-expert communications which set out the scope of an expert's engagement, and any other directives received from counsel. However, English courts, interpreting the English Civil Procedure Rules from which Article 5 of the CIArb Protocol was derived, have construed the term "instructions" widely to include all "the information being As such, under English law, the line between counsel-expert communications and "instructions" may be very faint. 29 Importing an expansive understanding of "instructions" into Article 5 of the CIArb Protocol could result in requests for disclosure of the whole range of counsel-expert communications, which would run against the basic expectations of arbitration practitioners outlined above.
Abuse
A third potential exception to the presumption of non-discoverability of counsel-expert communications arises in circumstances of abuse by counsel (and by the expert insofar as he or she allows such conduct). Although it is accepted practice that counsel may assist an expert in writing his or her report, overly intrusive style is frowned upon, and counsel who exert excessive influence over the content of an expert report do so at the risk of their expert's, and their own, credibility. As a noted arbitrator commented in response to a question posed for the purposes of this Article, "lawyerly ghostwriting" tends to annoy tribunals and may attract pointed questions by arbitrators about the precise circumstances of the genesis of an expert's report. The practice, though, is to deal with this abuse through questioning rather than through document production. While the concern that gives rise to questioning about abuse would logically lead to document production orders, that has not been the practice to date. The absence of known instances of document production orders arising from overly intrusive counsel is not, though, an argument that such orders would or should not be granted where warranted.
III. Comment on the Rationale for Discoverability of Counsel-Expert Communications in International Arbitration
In recent years, there has been growing concern in common law countries where party-appointed experts are used in domestic litigation that such experts tend to overlook their duty of independence to the court 30 and instead act as "hired guns" advocating for the party that retained Despite this, even interpreting the term "instructions" in Article 5 of the CIArb Protocol in light of English case law on the English Civil Procedure Rules, in the opinion of the authors the distinction between "instructions" (which are not privileged but which enjoy a strong presumption against disclosure absent "good cause") and other counsel-expert communications (which are subject to a privilege which may be waived) may not be material as a practical matter. Circumstances amounting to "good cause" may also constitute waiver of privilege. Indeed, the very same English case which proposed a wide interpretation of the term "instructions" in the Civil Procedure Rules also clarified that the presumption against disclosure of "instructions" absent good cause was "designed primarily to give protection to a party who would otherwise have waived privilege by being compelled to set out matters in an expert's report." Lucas, ¶ 31.
30
As a general matter, common law countries recognize that a party-appointed expert owes a duty to the court or tribunal to give an objective opinion, independent of any influence by the party which appointed him or her. In them with little or no objectivity. 31 This concern has led several common law jurisdictions to allow broader discovery of counsel-expert communications in an effort to promote greater independence and objectivity on the part of experts and to limit lawyer influence over the content of expert testimony.
As in common law jurisdictions, in international arbitration the role of party-appointed experts is to provide objective testimony aimed at assisting the arbitral tribunal, 32 and the problem of "hired guns" has led to calls for increased disclosure of counsel-expert communications. Some U.S. practitioners likewise argue in favor of full discoverability of counsel-expert communications in international arbitration in order to promote greater "neutrality, transparency and objectivity" in the use of party-appointed experts.
35
In the remainder of this Article, we survey the evidence of a trend towards greater discoverability of counsel-expert communications in domestic litigation. We then explain why the use of discovery as a means to promote greater independence and objectivity on the part of partyappointed experts should be resisted in international arbitration.
A. The Use of Discovery to Promote Experts' Independence and Objectivity in Domestic Litigation
United States
The trend towards greater discoverability of counsel-expert communications in litigation has been most evident in the United States. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 36 were amended in 1993 to broaden the disclosure obligations of party-appointed testifying experts. 37 Testifying experts must now disclose "the data or other information considered by the witness in forming" their opinions. 38 A narrower formulation requiring disclosure of those materials "relied upon"
by the expert was rejected due to concern that experts might deliberately conceal relevant but adverse information by determining that they had not relied upon it. 39 The duty to disclose under the U.S. 137, 152-53 (2008) .
35
See supra note 33.
36
Each State also has its own particular rules regarding the discovery obligations of expert witnesses in State court litigation. However, a survey of the laws across the United States is beyond the scope of this Article.
37
The extensive disclosure requirements apply only to testifying experts, not to mere consultants. and draft expert reports. 41 A testifying expert's duty to disclose any materials "considered" overrides the attorney work-product doctrine and other forms of privilege. 42 Litigation counsel in the United States can and do seek discovery of documents showing interactions between opposing counsel and their experts, including any exchanges of drafts. Counsel scrutinize changes in successive iterations of a testifying expert's report and cross-examine experts in connection with such changes in order to draw out any evidence of bias or undue attorney influence.
43
The practical consequence of this broad discovery mandate is not that U.S. litigation counsel distance themselves from the expert report drafting process. Rather, attorneys litigating in the United States know that that all materials considered by an expert, including communications with counsel, are discoverable, 44 and take steps to avoid generating discoverable communications.
Other Common Law Jurisdictions
The trend toward greater discoverability of counsel-expert communications is also perceptible in Australia, where measures to address the issue of partisan experts, including additional disclosure requirements, were adopted in the late 1990s. 45 The trend went the furthest in the Id., at 38.
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A catalyst for the reforms was the publication of an empirical study carried out by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration which showed that one of the major concerns among the Australian judiciary was a perception of bias on the part of expert witnesses. Expert's File, 56 U.N.B.L.J. 208, 242-49 (2007) .
B. The Case against Using Discovery to Promote Experts' Independence and Objectivity in International Arbitration
The authors are unaware of any international arbitration proceedings where disclosure of counsel-expert communications was ordered. Several of the practitioners surveyed commented that a move towards wide disclosure of counsel-expert communications would be an undesirable "Americanization" of international arbitration procedure. In the opinion of the authors, there are at least five reasons why the trend towards greater discoverability of counsel-expert communications should be resisted in international arbitration.
First, in contrast to U.S. domestic litigation, where experts often find themselves in front of juries, international arbitrators are sophisticated fact finders, adept at discerning the truth. As Johnny Veeder remarked with respect to witness statements: Therefore, increased disclosure of counsel-expert communications is ordinarily unnecessary. Arbitral tribunals are usually well capable of determining when an expert has failed to examine an issue with an objective eye.
Second, anyone who has read an unedited expert report understands that counsel often play an important role in shaping the scope, form, and internal consistency of an expert's report. An expert's trade is rarely drafting, and counsel may and should ensure that the report is clear, focused and free of unnecessary repetition and irrelevant material. Unrestrained communications between counsel and experts are also necessary to enable counsel and expert to explore theories of the case and to avoid factual misconceptions. The threat of disclosure of counsel-expert communications is likely to hamper counsel's efforts to strategize, theorize and fully develop the client's case. Were counsel-expert communications subject to production, an expert's ability to get to the bottom of the issues in the case, and to test various theories in conjunction with counsel, would be constrained to the detriment of both the client and the tribunal's fact-finding mission.
54
Third, document production tends to increase the cost of a case. While document production requests could, in theory, be tailored to seek production of only a few specified documents, this has not been the result in practice. By opening up counsel-expert communications to document production requests, document production overall would increase in cost.
Fourth, as the U.S. experience reveals, increased discoverability of counsel-expert communications rarely makes counsel-expert communications more transparent or experts more neutral. Instead, such discovery tends to result only in additional costs and inefficiencies. Faced with the threat of discovery of their communications with their experts, U.S. litigation counsel have been forced to become shrewder, and have become accustomed to minimizing any interaction with testifying experts that might create a paper trail. U.S. litigation counsel and testifying experts rarely exchange edited drafts, 55 and confine their discussions regarding possible edits to in-person meetings or marathon conference calls. Counsel also seek to evade the temporal reach of a production order by discussing an expert's theories and opinions well in advance of the drafting of any report and sometimes even before an expert is retained. and harm to the process that arises when counsel-expert communications are constrained by fear of discovery.
The rules allowing extended disclosure of counsel-expert communications are now being rolled back in some jurisdictions because of the difficulties and costs discussed above. In the United States, the American Bar Association (the "ABA") has recommended that the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended "to protect from discovery draft expert reports and communications between an attorney and a testifying expert relating to an expert's report." The amendment is currently being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court.
61
The ABA also recommended that, pending such amendment, counsel enter voluntary stipulations protecting from discovery draft reports and counsel-expert communications. 62 Similarly, in the Canadian province of British Columbia, a judicial reform task force has recommend narrowing the rules regarding discovery of counsel-expert communications because of the widespread use of "shadow experts" (i.e., consultants with whom counsel can freely discuss the case) alongside testifying experts, and the costs associated with such practice. 63 In England, although Lord
Woolf, commissioned to draft a report on Access to Justice in the 1990s, initially recommended that all counsel-expert communications be discoverable to "prevent the suppression of relevant opinions or factual material which did not support the case put forward by the party instructing the expert," Lord Woolf's final report ultimately rejected wide-ranging disclosure of counselexpert communications on the basis of similar concerns. 
IV. Conclusion
Counsel in international arbitration can feel free to communicate with their party's experts unconstrained by fear that, in the ordinary circumstance, their communications will be subject to production to the other side and to the arbitrators. There are exceptions to this rule, for documents referenced or relied upon by an expert, and (potentially) for documents pertaining to the scope of an expert's engagement. International arbitrators also retain discretion to require production if there is an adequate basis to find that the counsel-expert relationship has been abused and that a production order is needed. Experienced international arbitrators and practitioners remain, however, broadly opposed to the production of counsel-expert communications.
Opposition to production of counsel-expert communications is justified by the importance of unconstrained collaboration between counsel and experts, as such collaboration affects both the quality of the representation provided to the client and the quality and accessibility of the expert evidence submitted to the arbitral tribunal. Counsel activism in the expert report drafting process does not mean that the work product generated by a collaborative effort belongs to the counsel rather than to the expert, or that the expert will inevitably become an advocate for the party. An arbitral tribunal will quickly lose patience with expert evidence that is so tainted. Rather, counsel's assistance is often needed to edit and reformulate an expert draft in order to make the report of use to the arbitral tribunal. The suggestion that increased discoverability of counselexpert communications promotes expert independence and neutrality is belied by the experience of those national jurisdictions which, having implemented broader expert disclosure requirements, are now rolling back those rules because of the associated costs and inefficiency.
Were counsel-expert communications subject to broad production in international arbitration, the consequences would be less refined expert evidence and increased cost and inefficiency, but not enhanced independence or neutrality on the part of experts.
